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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Riviste di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftiche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Knowledge. BERTRAND RUSSELL. The Monist, XXIII, 4, pp. 481–493.

Understanding by the term 'mathematical logic' any logical theory whose object is the analysis and deduction of arithmetic and geometry by means of concepts belonging to logic, we may consider the mathematical results, the methods of mathematical reasoning, or the intrinsic nature of mathematical propositions. As the results have the greatest degree of certainty, we start with them. The most brilliant contributions in this line have been made in the exact theories that we have been able to form about infinity and continuity. The conception of numbers which lack some inductive properties has removed the contradictions in infinite number. Likewise a theory positing a continuum composed of an infinity of distinct elements has been worked out, thus banishing the contradictions formerly held to exist in realistic theories of time and space. The mathematical logic has also contributed its concepts of a function and a variable as aids in philosophical speculations. The old difficulty involved in the idea of the repetition of an identical cause is banished as we now posit only a constant relationship between the causes and effects of a certain kind, that is, the latter is a function of the former.—Mathematical logic deals with propositions which contain no constants other than logical constants, *i. e.*, constants from which particularity has been removed to the greatest possible degree. These logical constants are those which constitute pure form, and a formal proposition is one which is made up of them exclusively. In pure mathematics, we care nothing for the particularity of the subject as this is concerned with the verification of the hypothesis. All that concerns us is that the hypothesis shall truly imply the thesis regardless of whether its conditions are ever realized or not. The discussion is never concerning facts that are applicable to such and such an individual object; we need never know anything about the real world. The verification, in the case of particular objects, of the hypotheses framed about the variables is only necessary for the importance of the deductions, not for their truth. For this, all that is essential is that the hypothesis truly implies the thesis. Consequently we need true propositions about implication. These propositions are both premises and methods of obtaining consequences of the premises. As a result, if they are not true, we would not even arrive at a correct deduction (regardless of the truth or falsity of our premises). This is what differentiates the foundations of mathematics from the later parts. In the latter, we may start from false premises and still arrive at a logically correct conclusion, provided only our rules of deduction be correct. But in the foundations, the falsity of the premises implies the falsity of the deduction itself, as we are using invalid laws of operation.—The consequences of the analysis of mathematical knowledge are of value to the theory of knowledge. In the first place, the fact is clear that we need in this field premises which are not based on the data of sense. Every general proposition goes beyond the limits of knowledge obtained through the senses, which is wholly restricted to what is individual. If we appeal to the method of induction, we should not overlook the fact that in this case we are basing our generalization on the principle of induction which is itself not susceptible of proof in the sphere of experience. All knowledge obtained by reasoning needs logical principles which are a priori and universal. We thus have two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of particular facts which alone allows us to affirm existence, and knowledge of logical truth which alone allows us to reason about data. Scientific propositions are obtained from particular premises by means of logical principles. These latter possess the same objectivity, the same independence of mind, that the particular facts of the physical world possess. Their continued constancy, their universal validity for human minds, and their guarantee of correct deduction of fact, force us to a kind of scholastic realism, to the admission of a world of universals which subsists.

R. B. Owen.

The Genesis of the Categories. W. K. Wright. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., X, 24, pp. 645-657.

Recent developments in psychology and sociology confirm the contentions of pragmatists that such categories as space, time, thing, number, and causation are functional devices that have arisen in human experience to serve as effective instruments to action. Evidence is cited, chiefly from Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, to show that these categories are social in their origin, and that they have greatly varied in different societies and stages of culture, in response to practical exigencies. Truth is also classed as a category, and supposed to have arisen under similar circumstances. At first any sort of satisfaction following the acceptance of an idea probably made it true; but soon the satisfaction had to be referrable to a social standard, and usually it had to satisfy the instinct of curiosity in isolation from other instincts, and to satisfy the virtue of wisdom. "In a broad way, a truth may be defined as any cognitive material that is affectively satisfying to a social group, so that it may be employed as an instrument to action." This is not subjectivism, for the categories are social creations, and are the most permanent elements in human thought. The categories are real, not only in the sense that they are "postulates so valued by human beings that the latter would maintain their belief in them at whatever empirical cost," but also because the external universe "is such that when human organisms come into experiential relations with it, their percepts and categories are fairly efficient in enabling them to effect an adjustment with it."

W. K. W.

Le problème moral: Idées et Instincts. G. Bauchal. Revue philosophique, XXXVIII, 8, pp. 158–182.

The rapid advance of science has caused a decline of religious beliefs and accentuated the disagreement between the moral structure or personality of individuals, and the social and economic environment. The moral personality is a combination of moral ideas and morality proper, which latter is chiefly instinctive, and innate. So far as moral ideas are concerned, moral personality is adaptive to the social *milieu*, and evolves in accordance with economic and other demands. On the other hand, the instinctive basis of morality proper is more rigid and inelastic, for the moral instincts have not greatly varied during the historical period. However, there is evidence to show that the moral instincts are also modifiable and subject to social evolution—viz.: the fidelity of the dog to his master, an instinct newly acquired since the origin of the species; female modesty, an instinct greatly modified since the advent of Christianity; modifications in the instincts of the children of alcoholics, and of those who have excelled in some form of human activity. Such and other evidence cited indicates that moral instincts are probably to some extent subject to artificial selection, and that eugenic measures for this purpose are worthy of consideration.

W. K. Wright.

Die alte und die neue Logik. H. Kleinpeter. Z. f. Posit. Ph., I, 3, pp. 157–171.

For two thousand years logic was regarded as the unquestionable basis of philosophy and all science. To-day, nothing is so unanimously questioned by the different schools as the success of any attempt to found a logical system. The logic of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza all claimed to contain a criterion of truth not dependent on experience. They made the mistaken attempt to infer being from mere thought. There have been three notable efforts made to establish a reformed logic, resulting in the psychological, the transcendental or Kantian, and the symbolic logic. A fourth might be mentioned, in connection with such names as Mach, Schiller, and Poincaré. Psychological logic is found in the works of Herbart, Brentano, Wundt, and Sigwart. Symbolic or mathematical logic, which began with Leibniz, is chiefly found in the writings of Peano, Padoa, Schröder, Russell, Couturat, and Royce. Of these, only Padoa and Royce satisfy the demands of science. No unity of system or theory is apparent among the different representatives. Two kinds of error vitiate their results, one depending on the superfluity and tautology of the propositions; the other, on the adherence to out-worn philosophy,—as in the case of the old ontological argument. Royce admits that the world of the logician is one of hypotheses, theories, and ideal constructions. Mach justifies natural science, as did Goethe and Nietzsche, by showing that logic depends upon its agreement with experience to make it valid. The pragmatists also say that truth depends upon usefulness. Experience alone may be said to contain a criterion of truth, but logical thought includes a system of those forms which organize our experience. If logic is to develop further it must ally itself with mathematics for a systematic investigation of the forms of thought which are already known and used.

ALMA R. THORNE.

L'œuvre d'Henri Poincaré: Le Philosophe. L. BRUNSCHVICG. Rev. de Mét., XXI, 5, pp. 585–616.

The example of Poincaré proves that creative genius did not perish with the golden age of mathematics, the seventeenth century. One of the chief problems of mathematical research before his time was the question of certitude. In Poincaré's work it is an investigation, not of certitude, but of truth. The classical notion of truth or verity was based on intuition. Poincaré, as philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, and physicist, demonstrated that science does not depend upon intuitional verity, but upon principles which are conventional formulas, chosen for their convenience in reconciling the intellectual requirements of simplicity and approximate representation of sensible data. In substituting the notion of convenience for that of intuitional verity, Poincaré seems to have overthrown the objectivity of geometry and rational physics, and to have allied himself with pragmatism, but his critique really introduces into science a verity that has universality. He distinguishes carefully between principles that are conventions and those which are arbitrary. Conventions rest on an experimental origin and are always subject to revision when experience proves that they are not the most convenient formulas of explanation. For Poincaré, convenience is not merely logical simplicity, but is also that which gives intelligence its grasp on things themselves. Mathematical reasoning is inductive, and a complete induction has the force of irresistible evidence, which is no other than the mind's affirmation of its own power to conceive the indefinite repetition of an act once found possible. The direct intuition of this power can be transformed into the direct intuition of data, in the realistic sense of the word. Reflection upon pure mathematics shows that science develops on a plane intermediate between formal logic and intuition. Though we cannot have a direct intuition of space, direction, and distance, there are found in physics and mathematics laws which seem to be based on the unvarying relations between "brute facts." Two principles which seem to be imposed upon the very nature of things are simplicity and continuity. Poincaré finds simplicity to be a relative principle, always subject to further analysis. The ultimate postulate of scientific faith is the belief in continuity. "Without it," says Poincaré, "science would not exist." The only truly objective reality, for him, is that internal harmony of the world which is the source of all beauty.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Life and Logic. H. WILDON CARR. Mind, 88, pp. 484-492.

Bosanquet's theory of the absolute is similar to M. Bergson's theory in the following respects. First, experience is appearance and reality has to be sought. Secondly, reality is infinite, and in living experience we touch it and know it. Thirdly, reality is of the nature of consciousness. Fourthly, discursive thought leads to contradiction and inconsistency, and the absolute is where reconciliation is found. The two theories differ in that Bosanquet contends that reality is not given immediately but by logical processes, while M. Bergson contends that reality is given immediately in the intuition of life and that reality is not given by thought. Bosanquet calls Bergson's theory of the indeterminism of life a guidance theory, but it is not the kind which it is assumed to be by Bosanquet. Bergson does not regard the relation of life to the organism as that of two different kinds of reality. The opposition between the logical doctrines of these two men is due to the principle behind each of them. For Bosanquet thinking starts with identity, and seeks to attain the whole. For Bergson the intellect is an instrument of action. Bosanquet answers successfully a criticism of mechanical determinism against the absolute, but Bergson's criticism is not that of mechanical determinism. For both of these men spatialized time is appearance. The issue is in regard to the nature of the absolute. Bosanquet says the absolute is timeless, Bergson says the absolute is time.

C. M. HOBART.

Idealism and the Reality of Time. HUGH A. REYBURN. Mind, 88, pp. 493-508.

The postulate of idealism is that reality is a single system. The absolute is this single system as a whole. The remedy for the defects of idealism is more system. Bosanquet contends that the whole is rational in nature, and that the dialectic of experience not only condemns appearances but also reconstructs the world. He also tends toward holding time to be unreal. While Professor Ward considers reality from the view of history and morality, Bosanquet views the matter as art and religion. The antithesis that will be dealt with here is that of art and history. The difficulty of treating reality in terms of art is that the time element is liable to be overlooked. Time requires permanence and unity of content, and implies change and exclusiveness. Each of these aspects is essential. Temporal externality of parts is similar to spatial externality of parts. The externality of time is distinct from the externality of space. Time involves succession. Time is sometimes judged to be unreal by denying change. However we know reality only through change. Change and time are usually judged unreal by taking two or more aspects of the whole of these conceptions, and by setting these different isolated aspects over against one another to produce contradiction. One of these aspects is considered real, and the rest unreal. McTaggart uses this method. Bosanquet also holds to the view of the subjectivity of time. For him time is a hindrance for one in comprehending the total real. He contends that the unity which continues through time is the important consideration. This view accords with considering the whole from the standpoint of art. Although time is an element in the presentation of the whole it is unessential. Meaning is the essential element. Idealism should not adopt such a position because the absolute must include succession. In many instances the unity of the whole is dependent upon the self-externality of time. An absolute which ignores succession omits a great deal of the meaning of life. If we desire to call the self free, there must not be anything alien to it. Externality must not be opposed to the self. Bosanquet admits that one can never explain the appearance of the whole in finite minds. This admission of inability to explain finite things displays a failure in method. We have two alternative views left. First, the absolute itself is changeless, but change occurs within the absolute. Secondly, the absolute is a permanent which changes, and one element is equal in importance to the other.

C. M. HOBART.

The Aviary Theory of Truth and Error. A. W. MOORE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., X, 20, pp. 542–546.

If true and false are attributes of the *objects* of belief or judgment, not of the *act* or *process* of belief; if truth and error are respectively belief in the real and the unreal; if belief is the attitude we take toward any proposition that *appears* to be true or real, as Professor Montague in *The New Realism* asserts, then the object of belief must be either all truth or all error. Belief in the unreal as unreal is no more a case of error than is belief in real as real. The only possibility of error is that the unreal shall appear as real, but who will determine that? The fallacy of the neo-realist lies in the partition of belief into a contentless, subjective, mental act on the one hand and an actionless content or object on the other.

HENRY BENTSON.

The Last Phase of Professor Ward's Philosophy. J. H. MUIRHEAD. Mind, 87, pp. 321–331.

Professor Ward's philosophy, a revolt against the older idealism with its static Absolute, starts with a world of self-determining monads united into a "totum objectivum" by mere coexistence. His problem is to explain the actual constitution of the world as a Realm of Ends, or, more specifically, (1) to explain the subsequent development of the monads toward ever greater union and coöperation, and at the same time, ever greater individuality; and (2) to guarantee the continuance of this development and the ultimate triumph of the good. Ward succeeds just in so far as he departs from his pluralistic assumptions and appeals to Absolutism. (1) Starting with a plurality of individuals impelled by a blind desire of self-preservation, Ward cannot account for progress to an objective social order involving the subordination of private to common ends, without introducing idealistic conceptions, such as "an impulse to betterment," inconsistent with his presuppositions. (2) In guaranteeing the continuance and completion of the gradual supremacy of the good over evil by appealing to the existence of intelligences that have a directing power over evolution, Ward repudiates his principle of continuity, admits the inadequacy of his previous explanation, and brings in a conception that will necessitate a reconstruction of his whole philosophy. Thus Personal Idealism fails. Moral and religious consciousness implies an absolutistic metaphysic. Absolutism does not deny the reality of time, freedom, progress, and personality, though it finds their value in something not a process of time.

Raymond P. Hawes.

Plato's Erkenntnislehre in ihren Beziehungen zur Kantischen. S. Marck. Kant Studien, XVIII, 3, pp. 246–262.

A fair interpretation of Plato and Kant reveals the problems and results of the former reappearing in the latter, although transformed by his more completely critical analysis of the nature of thought and by the modern conception of natural science. Each thinker adopted the problem of knowledge isolated from other philosophical questions as the focal point of his investigations. Like Kant, Plato based his critique not on dogmatic assumptions but on the actual procedure of science, exemplified for him in mathematics. Each showed the inadequacy of contemporary empiricism by rigorously developing it; for Plato, too, "Perception without concepts is blind." Both critiques substantiate the universal validity of judgments. The method of hypothesis taught Plato that it is the nature of thought to view things through the medium of principles. The use and appreciation of this method unites the two men even more intimately than their common attitude toward empiricism or their common subject. Yet for Kant, the Platonic doctrine of ideas was the stock example of an unwarrantable metaphysics. In spite of the fact that he overemphasized the speculative side of the doctrine of ideas, which is essentially epistemological, Kant's criticism lays bare the ultimate weakness of the Platonic development of the concept of method. Plato failed to separate the form and content of knowledge; his idea was a new content, not a principle of knowledge. Idealism really came into its own when Kant applied the categories, the forms of thought, to experience, its content. Plato saw the eternal essence of science without being able to deduce its possibility systematically. For Kant, science is an actual fact which must be analyzed into its purely logical conditions; for Plato, science itself is an idea. In the Parmenides, the system of fixed ideas was transformed into a system of relations, but it was not applied to experience, principally because Plato knew no natural science worthy the name. Kant was able to start with the idea of a developed natural science, and it is the experience theory of the critical philosophy that fulfills the concept of method. The distinction between the form and content of thought, the fuller appreciation of the spontaneity of the mind in determining the form, and of the value of experience as constituting the content of knowledge, the insight into the essentially conditioned nature of knowledge, the very separation of science and philosophy—all these elements distinguish Kant's epistemology from Plato's. Yet in his ethics and metaphysics, Kant again found an Absolute and Unconditioned. A doctrine of ideas transcending experience became the regulating principles of knowledge. Finally, the Platonic Idea of the Good, as lying beyond merely mathematical ideas, is apparently an anticipation of the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding, in which distinction it is fully explicated and justified.

ANITA FREDERICA DE LAGUNA.

Recent Criticism of Kant's Theory of Knowledge. G. DAWES HICKS. Mind, 87, pp. 331–344.

This article is a critical review of Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* and Sidgwick's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant, and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays.* Each criticises from a hostile, realistic point of view. In opposition to Kant each maintains the "transcendental reality" of space, time, and material entities. Each finds the Kantian epistemology to issue in Subjectivism. Kant's mechanical theory of knowledge implies that knowledge is within the subject and is the mind's "construction." Prichard insists that knowing is the "discovery" of realities independent of mind. Prichard wrongly attributes Kant's confusion to the view that knowledge is synthesis. Kant means by synthesis, not "spatial synthesis," as Prichard believes, but the very act of knowing. Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding is responsible for his Subjectivism. Prichard, accepting this distinction, also becomes ensnared in Subjectivism. Kant erroneously thought he had evaded Subjectivism by distinguishing between the inner and outer senses, each knowing its reality with equal immediacy and certainty. Occasionally he recognizes the real issue: the relation of the contents of external perception to real existence. Kant believes the consciousness of any existence in time implies the existence of permanent outer "objects" distinct from "Vorstellungen." By "Vorstellungen" Kant means the content known, not a process of mind as Prichard and Sidgwick hold. Sidgwick rightly urges that by "objects" Kant means objects of possible experience. Prichard asserts that in the first edition of the Analytic the meaning of "objects" shifts from things-in-themselves to phenomenal objects. This is improbable. Prichard contends that Kant's thing-in-itself is the correlate to the unity of consciousness. Not always in Kant is "transcendental object" synonymous with noumenon or thing-in-itself. According to Prichard, Kant considers space "a priori" because we apprehend empty space before we apprehend spatial relations of objects in it. But "a priori" denotes logical not chronological priority. Space by itself is never perceived. It is merely a condition of the possibility of perception. Prichard wrongly maintains contrary to Kant that space is a concept derived by generalization from particular objects. Prichard's chapters on "The Schematism of the Categories" and "Time and Inner Sense" contain much admirable criticism.

Raymond P. Hawes.

Die Begründung einer idealen Weltanschauung. Karl Skopek. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIX, 3, pp. 289-318.

In this article, Dr. Skopek gives a brief historical review of idealism and materialism and then proceeds to develop the outlines of a world-view based in essentials upon the doctrine of Leibniz. In the historical part of the article he distinguishes between two forms of idealism,—pantheism and theism,—making a further distinction between the pantheism of emanation, that of evolution, and that of immanence. Dr. Skopek traces the pantheism of emanation from the Indian philosophy through Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, the Jewish Cabala, Sufiism, and the system of Joannes Scotus Erigina. The pantheism of evolution is traced through Heracleitus, the Stoics, Bruno, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Edouard von Hartmann. Thirdly, the pantheism of immanence is illustrated by reference to Xenophanes, Parmenides and Spinoza. Turning to materialism, Dr. Skopek first alludes to this tendency in Indian philosophy and then shows the development of materialistic theory through Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Gassendi and Hobbes, referring briefly also to Feuerbach, Moleschott, Vogt, Büchner, du Bois Reymond, and Benedikt. In the second or critical and constructive part of the article, Dr. Skopek maintains that pantheism destroys the individual, that it destroys all teleology, and that it leads to pessimism and quietism. He also holds materialism to be untenable, chiefly for epistemological reasons. He then develops what he calls the dynamical or spiritualistic world-view, drawing chiefly upon the monadology of Bruno and Leibniz. This view, he holds, avoids the difficulties of both pantheism and materialism, gives a satisfactory metaphysical account of the nature of matter, adequately recognizes the individual, gives due place to teleology, and affords a satisfactory theory of the relation of God to the world. According to Dr. Skopek, the physical and chemical researches of Faraday, Crookes, Stoney, Poincaré, Weiss, Le Bon, and others, and the biological investigations of Weismann are in harmony with this view.

J. R. Tuttle.

The Nature and Development of Attention. G. Dawes Hicks. Br. J. Ps., VI, 1, pp. 1-25.

By one class of thinkers, attention is treated as a sort of light which is directed upon presentations; by another class, as a property or attribute of the presentations themselves. Both positions err in that they treat presentations as objects, for the presentation is inseparable from the process of apprehending itself. The peculiarities of the facts of attention are only to be understood by reference to the simpler and more primordial processes of mind. Attention arises as a complicated and highly developed modification of the fundamental process of apprehension and is largely of the nature of a habit. The elementary components of mind are acts of apprehension which come later to be distinguished as sense-qualities, as sense-feelings, or as impulses or strivings which find a terminus in bodily movement. In the simplest form of psychic life, some discrimination or comparison is involved. In fact, there are infinitely various specific modes of such discrimination in the course of mental evolution. On this view of attention, we may distinguish in the process three characteristics: (*a*) a selection of certain features within the field of what is apprehended; (*b*) the increased clearness and distinctness of the content attended to; (*c*) experiences in the form of feeling-tone that precede or accompany the attitude of attending. As a result of this last, the content is detained for a time before the mind and an opportunity is given for the establishment of associations between this and other contents and for easy and rapid reproductions of the content in the form of images. Clearness and distinctness are produced, neither by a mere increase of mental energy directed upon a content, nor by a mutual interplay of presentations, conflicting with and reinforcing one another, but by the gradual discrimination within a vague, ill-differentiated whole of certain characteristic marks in a given content. If sense-contents are accompanied by movement, or if they incite pleasurable or painful feelings, they will retain a more prominent place in consciousness. Secondary attention may be accounted for on the same general principles as primary. Secondary attention depends more on the connection of a given content with the past experience of the subject than upon the absolute vividness of presentation. The range of this type of attention varies greatly with the successive stages in the development of mind. The special features that call for explanation in the higher forms of attention, known as voluntary or deliberate, follow naturally from the varying circumstances that appear in the course of mental development. Volition and the consciousness of self arise chiefly through progressively co-ordinated sense-experiences which are concomitants of bodily movements. At the same time, the mental activity involved in feelings of strain or effort is only a part of the whole activity of apprehending.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Le concept sociologique de progrès. EUGÈNE DE ROBERTY. Rev. Ph., XXXVIII, 3, pp. 251–261.

The neo-positivist school proposes to make of sociology an autonomous and rigorously abstract science, and to revise all the chief sociological terms. The hitherto obscure idea of progress is treated by this school as belonging to the sociology of action. The subject-matter of the sociology of action is constituted by the ends which human beings strive to realize. These ends really act as final causes with regard to action, yet both popular and scientific thought often treat them as efficient causes. Causes both external and internal make us always act in the same way under the same conditions. From the sociological point of view, social phenomena are neither good nor evil, but indifferent, like physico-chemical phenomena. The finalism which characterizes the facts of reason is determined by causes of the internal order. All forms of social thought obey the laws of finality. The phenomenon of human activity guided by voluntary ends which have both an affective and an ideal character, is part of the general order of nature. The creative force which causes the evolution of morals and customs, law and the institutions of civilized peoples, is always abstract thought. The notion of an absolute progress must give place to that of a relative progress, in the various manifestations of which there appears a common element, the augmentation of knowledge, whether physico-chemical, biological, or superorganic. The development of these three grand divisions of knowledge is the unique and permanent source of all social progress.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Vers l'Unité. CARDINAL D. J. MERCIER. Rev. Néo-Sc., XX, 79, pp. 254–278.

A historical survey of its development illustrates the fact that philosophy, if it aspires to a stable balance, must use all its resources in submitting to the reflective reason the moral as well as the speculative order, with the object of uniting in an integral synthesis the total content of human consciousness. Separatism is the vice of modern thought, though one which it is progressively overcoming. As judgments of fact and judgments of value arise from different preoccupations of our intelligence, it is natural that it should form them separately at first, but not less so that it should later compare them to see if they may not be combinable. Plato recognized the essential unity of the good, the beautiful, and the true. Christian tradition, from the Church Fathers to the Doctors of the Middle Ages, following first Plato and later Aristotle, was unanimous in forming a comprehensive conception of the task of philosophy. Beginning with the twelfth century, philosophy and theology became distinct disciplines, but no one, before the time of Descartes, found his duty or privilege to drop out of consideration any factor of consciousness. Descartes, however, erected separatism into a system. For him, to philosophize is to judge, to know; nothing more, nothing less; his first step is to divest himself of previous knowledge, belief, sentiment. Moral data become facts of consciousness simply, significant only as such. Spinoza, on the other hand, proclaimed a comprehensive, unified system; but his voice was unheeded. Kant embraced, indeed, in his criticism, the two domains of thought and action, but only deepened the moat which separated them. Then came the scientific movement, and knowledge, theory, became again supreme. Reaction set in with Brunetière's declaration of the failure of science. Pragmatism and voluntarism in various forms rapidly grained gound, and today the issue is clearly drawn between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Analysis is necessary, but as a means to an ultimate synthesis. Two currents are leading philosophy toward a unitary conception. Pragmatism may be passed over, as a method rather than a system. A group of French thinkers, on the other hand, show constructive originality. Ollé-Laprune furnished the initial impulse, and insists on preserving experience whole and intact, including the religious side. Bergson, successful in overthrowing intellectualism by transferring the emphasis to intuition, has not, however, assisted much in the necessary reconstruction. His theory of immanence is only an elegant poem woven on a fictitious warp. It is to Wilbois and Blondel that we must look for the solution of the problem. With them, God is not a mere pantheistic deification of becoming; he is transcendent, personal. The "élan vital" becomes the "élan humain"; we meet the transcendent in the social reality, in the life of humanity. The Christian virtues, faith, hope and charity, link us to God. Not directly, however, but indirectly; the union of the outer and inner facts can only take place through a living faith, and this comes from the docile acceptance of the divine revelation embodied in the teaching of the historic Catholic Church.

F. H. KNIGHT.